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This paper investigates an impact of the government policies aimed at the enterprise
sector on competitiveness of this sector. The analysis was based on an example of the
Polish manufacturing sector and the eight-year period from 1996 to 2003. Section 1
presents different notions and measures of competitiveness and defines the one adopted
for the purpose of the present analysis - the trade measure. Section 2 presents an
assessment of the competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector on both the
internal (domestic) and external market, in particular the EU-15 market. Subsequently,
the authors compare domestic and external competitiveness of individual
manufacturing industries and present conclusions on the competitive and non-
competitive branches. Section 3 describes a size of government interventions affecting
manufacturing enterprises in the years 1996-2003. These interventions took the
following forms: income (corporate and personal) taxes imposed on enterprises, excise
taxes, VAT, depreciation rates, subsidies, and social security contributions. A size of the
state ownership in the manufacturing sector was examined in the analysis, too. Section
4 presents results of the econometric analysis of factors influencing the competitiveness
of the Polish manufacturing sector on both the internal (Polish) and external (EU-15)
market. Moreover, an impact of different government policy instruments on
competitiveness is assessed by means of the linear regressions. Section 5 contains
conclusions. The general recommendation is that the competitiveness of the Polish
manufacturing sector could be increased by relaxing fiscal burden, further privatization
and restructuring of state owned companies. The state aid in a form of subsidies seems
to harm both internal and external competitiveness rather than to support them.
5
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Abstract
There is a vast body of economic literature discussing the role of the state and
its scope in democratic countries. A role of the state in market economies as well
as its implications for economic processes and their outcomes is an aspect widely
examined by economists. A number of issues are of interest to us here. They can be
grouped in four themes.
The role of the state as an owner has been a topic of debates both in theoretical
works and empirical studies. The dominant question appears: is it necessary for the
state to be an owner at all? If yes, what the areas of ownership should be and under
what conditions the government is justified to take the role of an owner?
Furthermore, the efficiency of the state in this capacity is being tested and
questioned in the subject literature. 
The second important issue of interest connected to the topic is the role of the
state as a regulator. Regulations are examined from the point of view of their
impact on the scope of economic activities undertaken by entrepreneurs and
macroeconomic performance of the country. Such by-outcomes of regulations as:
costs and time burden for businesses, the grey economy development and
corruption are frequently discussed by economists. Additionally, numerous
empirical investigations have been undertaken in order to examine if the state
intervention meets the regulations` aim, which is to improve quality of public
goods and eliminate externalities.
The third issue of relevance to us is the scope of government, which is
measured by the scope of government expenditures. Governments pursue fiscal
policies with an aim to generate sufficient financial resources to deliver not only
core public goods (such as internal and external security, functioning of the rule of
law), but also to cover social and investment spending. For this aim they employ
not only the tax policy, but also the labor policy and pension regulations. The
6
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1 The paper is a result of the project 'Changes in Industrial Competitiveness as a Factor of Integration:
Identifying Challenges of the Enlarged Single European Market' funded from the 5th Framework
Programme of the European Community (Ref. HPSE-CT-2002-00148). The authors are solely responsible
for the content of the paper. It does not represent the opinion of the Community and the Community is
not responsible for any use that might be made of data appearing therein.
impact of the scope of government on behavior of entrepreneurs (the micro
approach) as well as employment and economic growth (the macro approach) have
attracted the attention of both the economic theory and empirical economic
research. It is worth remembering that economists’ findings are very important to
policy makers. 
Finally, there is the industrial policy performed by governments on the
grounds of market failure. The usual instruments of government interventions are
tax allowances, subsidies, investment incentives and free or cheap credit for
certain activities. In transition economies there was an extra reason for
governments to intervene: the need to alleviate consequences of major transition
shocks suffered by enterprises undergoing restructuring2. In the member
countries of the European Union the governments’ support to enterprises
(formally called the state aid) is strictly regulated by the European law, monitored
by independent public institutions and reported to the European Commission. It
results from the fact that any public aid that distorts or threatens to distort
competition is generally regarded as incompatible with the EU four freedoms.
Transition countries negotiating for accession had to gradually adjust their
industrial policies to the EU state aid regulations3.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of the government enterprise
sector policies on the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector in Poland. In
addition, this study also examines the impact of state ownership in the
manufacturing sector. The analysis is made for 2-digit industries (i.e. divisions) as
well as for 3-digit industries (i.e. groups)4. There are 23 divisions and 102 groups
altogether (see them listed in the Appendix, Tables 1 and 2). The period observed
embraces the years 1996-2003 and the scope of analysis was constrained by the
availability of data.  
The paper is organized as follows:
• Section 1 presents different notions and measures of competitiveness and defines
the one adopted for the purpose of the present analysis - the trade measure. 
7
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2 This subject was studied within the framework of the same project at the earlier stage. The findings and a
comparative analysis for the three transition countries: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are
presented in Hashi et al (2004).
3 The evolution of industrial policies in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in the view of the EU
accession was also examined within the same project (for the comparative analysis see Hashi et al, 2004). 
4 As defined by the NACE rev. 1.1 classification, which is a nomenclature of economic activities used by the
European Community EUROSTAT. Besides 2-digit and 3-digit industries, data was collected also for
bigger groupings: sections (1-digit level); subsections - intermediate level between 1- and 2-digit level
industries. In Poland this classification was introduced in 1994 (under the term PKD - The Polish
Classification of Activities).
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• Section 2 presents an assessment of the competitiveness of the Polish
manufacturing sector on both the internal (domestic) and external market, in
particular the EU-15 market. Subsequently, domestic and external
competitiveness of individual manufacturing industries are compared and
conclusions are drawn on competitive and non-competitive branches. The
EU-15 market was chosen for the analysis due to the fact that in the 1990ties
the European Union’s member countries taken as a group became the main
trading partner for Poland5 and in the first years of the new decade remained
at this position. Moreover, their importance is expected to further increase
thanks to the Poland's EU accession in May 2004. 
• Section 3 describes a size of government interventions affecting
manufacturing enterprises in the years 1996-2003. These interventions took
the following forms: income (corporate and personal) taxes imposed on
enterprises, excise taxes, VAT, depreciation rates, subsidies, and social
security contributions. In addition, the analysis also examines a size of the
state ownership in the manufacturing sector. 
• Section 4 presents results of the econometric analysis of factors influencing
the competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector on both the internal
(Polish) and external (EU-15) market. Moreover, an impact of different
government policy instruments on competitiveness is assessed by means of
linear regressions. 
• Section 5 contains conclusions.
8
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5 In the years 1995-2001 68-70% of the total Polish exports were absorbed by the EU (Yearbook of Foreign
Trade Statistics 2002). In 2003 the EU’s share in the Polish exports accounted for 68.8% (Concise
Statistical Yearbook of Poland 2005, Table 237). In the case of the Polish imports the importance of the
EU zone was smaller, however, the European goods and services dominated (61-65%).
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Although competitiveness is a commonly used term, there is not a single or
dominant definition, or one, which would make the notion a comprehensible one.
Different understandings of the notion “competitiveness” brought about numerous
measures of competitiveness used to assess a position of an economy, sector or
enterprise vis-à-vis others (Wziątek-Kubiak, 2003). One of the explanations could
be that the term competitiveness has its origin not in the economic theory, but in
the politics. 
In this paper we use the term competitiveness in the sense that was proposed to
the project team by the project coordinator: Professor Anna Wziątek-Kubiak. In our
paper competitiveness is understood as an ability to sell products on a market in
competition with other producers. It is a relative term, i.e. the position of a producer
is assessed vis-à-vis its competitors (see Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek 2004). The novelty
of the approach adopted lies in the fact that besides export performance (which is
typical for the trade definition of competitiveness), it also examines performance on
the domestic (internal) market. More specifically, competitiveness is being judged by
the ability of manufacturers based in Poland to sell on EU markets as well as on their
domestic market where they are competing with EU producers. The adopted
measures of competitiveness are the changes in the share of the domestic and external
(EU) markets. Obviously, these measures have some weaknesses (Wziątek-Kubiak and
Winek 2004, p. 5), but none approach is free of them.
Being constrained by data available for the Polish manufacturing sector on the
one side, and for the EU member countries' consumption of the manufacturing
goods - on the other side, we will use the following two measures to evaluate
competitiveness of the Polish manufacturers on the two markets: 
For the domestic market we take the share of the Polish manufacturing goods
in the domestic  consumption (in Poland) of manufacturing products. The domestic
(internal) competitiveness of the manufacturing sector (DCM in short) is
calculated it in the following way:
9
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1. What does Competitiveness Mean
and How do We Measure It?
DCM = [(Total Sales of Manufacturing Sector) - (Total Exports)]: [(Total
Sales) - (Total Manufacturing Exports) + (Total Manufacturing Imports)]
To measure the competitiveness of Polish manufacturing products on the external,
and in particular on the European Union market we should analogically calculate the
share of Polish manufacturing exports in the apparent consumption of manufacturing
goods in the EU-15. We did so for the years 1996-20016, however, due to lack of data
for the years 2002-2003, we had to employ a different measure. To evaluate external
(foreign) competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector (in short ECM), we
studied the share of Polish manufacturing exports to the EU-15 in intra-exports of
manufacturing goods of the EU-25. The following formula was applied:
ECM = [Polish Manufacturing Exports to EU-15] : [EU-25 Intra Exports],
where EU-25 Intra Exports = [EU-15 Intra Exports + EU-15 Exports to 10
acceding countries + Exports of 10 acceding countries to EU-15]
10
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2.1. Overall Competitiveness
In the beginning of the period subject to observation in this study, 68% of
manufacture products sold on the Polish market were produced by the domestic
manufacturing sector; the remaining 32% were coming from imports, including
the EU-15 (see Figure 1 below). In the course of next years the share of Polish
manufacturers in consumption of manufacturing goods in Poland had been
constantly dropping, and in the last two years the pace of decrease had even
speeded up. Altogether their share in the domestic market had decreased by 15
percent points, and in 2003 was at the level of 53%. Therefore, taking our definition
of competitiveness, we have to conclude that overall domestic competitiveness of
the Polish manufacturing sector had substantially decreased in the eight-year time
preceding Poland’s EU accession. 
This conclusion needs to be placed in an appropriate context. Firstly, it is
important to notice that the domestic consumption of manufacturing goods grew
faster than the domestic production, therefore the gap between the two had to be
filled in by imports. Secondly, increased imports indicate that the Polish market
has become more open and competition has become fiercer. Thirdly, Polish
manufacturing exports increased significantly and at a faster pace than the
production did, which indicates that Polish manufacturers expose themselves
increasingly and with a success7 to tough competition on developed markets that
dominate in Poland's exports destinations8.
11
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7 In the sense that they place their products on the external markets (i.e. manage to sell them). The first and
most important step to check what instruments the manufacturers use to compete, should be the analysis
of their export prices vis-à-vis prices of their competitors. This would bring the answer whether this is a
price competition. In order to examine whether export is a profitable activity for Polish producers, costs
of export production and costs of export itself should be evaluated and confronted with export revenues.
8 For more discussion on these developments see Balcerowicz (2005).
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2. Competitiveness of the Polish
Manufacturing Sector, 1996-2003
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Note: DCM ranks from 0 to 1.
Source: The authors' own calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Office (Statistical Yearbook of
Industry and Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics, different years).
Figure 1. Domestic Competitiveness of the Polish Manufacturing Sector (DCM), 1996-2003
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Source: The authors' own calculations based on data from the Central Statistical Office (Statistical Yearbook of
Industry and Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics, different years) and COMEXT database.
Figure 2. External Competitiveness of the Polish Manufacturing Sector (ECM), 1996-2003
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Contrary to the evidence for the domestic market position of the Polish
manufacturing sector, the external competitiveness of the sector had increased in
the eight-year period from 1,0% to 1.8% (see Figure 2 below). The increase was
substantial; however the EU-15 market share of Polish producers remains at a
marginal level. This can be explained by the difference in size between the Polish
economy and rich and well-developed economies of the majority of the EU-15
members (the consumption of manufacturing commodities in the EU is enormous
in comparison with the size of the Polish manufacturing production) and also by
the fact that the Polish economy had been practically closed for decades.  
2.2. Domestic and External Competitiveness of 2-digit Industries
Within the framework of the research study we performed a panel data
analysis, which enabled us to identify relative differences in competitiveness
among industries. The differences can be attributed to a fixed individual effect of
each industry. Estimated values of these effects turned out to be significant in the
model9. Generally, we can divide industries into three categories: higher than
average competitive, lower than average competitive and close to average
competitive. A strong and positive fixed effect indicates an above average
competitiveness of an industry, while a strong and negative fixed effect indicates a
below average level of performance of an industry on the market. Findings for 2-
digit and 3-digit industries are presented in the following two subsections. 
The level of domestic competitiveness is diversified among different
manufacturing divisions. Results of the panel data regression indicate the most
competitive 2-digit industries10 in the following way:
15 – Manufacture of food products and beverages
16 – Manufacture of tobacco products,
20 – Manufacture of wood and wood, straw and wicker products,
22 – Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media, 
23 – Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products,
26 – Manufacture of the non-metallic mineral products, and
37 – Recycling.
13
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9 Estimations were done by Szymanski (2005) and the results are discussed in Sobolewski (2005a, 2005b).
10 See Table 3 in the Appendix, row 37.
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The least competitive divisions had been:
17 – Manufacture of textiles, 
29 – Manufacture of machinery and equipment n. e. c., 
30 – Manufacture of office machines and computers, 
32 – Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and
apparatus, 
35 – Manufacture of other transport equipment.
The remaining eleven 2-digit manufacturing industries were included in the
average competitive group. This group contains divisions with fixed effects deviating
by less than 20 percent points (in plus or in minus) from the average level of the
domestic market share. Among them 18, 19, 24, 27, 31, 33 and 34 deviated by more
than 10 percent points in minus from the average market share.
As far as external competitiveness is concerned, the panel data regression
shows11 that the following three manufacturing divisions were the most
competitive on the external market: 
18 – Manufacture of wearing apparel and furriery, 
20 – Manufacture of wood and wood, straw and wicker products, 
36 – Manufacture of furniture  and manufacturing not elsewhere classified. 
For this group of industries their shares in the EU-25 intra exports exceeded by
more than one percent point the average share of the Polish manufacturing exports
to the EU-15 in the EU-25 intra exports.
The least competitive divisions were:
15 – Manufacture of food products and beverages, 
16 – Manufacture of tobacco products, 
22 – Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media, 
23 – Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, 
24 – Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, 
30 – Manufacture of office machines and computers.
The remaining 14 manufacturing divisions (no: 17, 19, 21, 25-29, 31-35, 37)
belonged to the average competitive group (with less than 1 percent point deviation
either in plus or in minus from the average). 
14
Ewa Balcerowicz, Maciej Sobolewski
11 For the results see Table 4 in the Appendix, row 19.
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The overall competitiveness of individual manufacturing divisions is presented
in Table 1 below.
The best group of the most competitive manufacturing divisions on both the
domestic and EU markets consists of one industry only and this is 20 - Manufacture
of wood and wood, straw and wicker products. The next group of well performing
industries consists of four divisions (26 – Manufacturing of the non-metallic mineral
products, 37 – Recycling, 18 – Manufacture of wearing apparel and furriery and 36
– Manufacturing of other transport equipment) that possess a much above average
share in either of the two markets and an average share in the EU one. 
There is a group of four industries which have a very strong position on the
domestic market, but are less than averagely competitive on the external market.
These are: 15 – Manufacture of food products and beverages, 16 – Manufacture of
tobacco products, 22 – Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
and 23 – Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products.
The most numerous group is the one with an average DCM and ECM (eight
divisions). Successive eight industries have an average share in one of the two
markets and are the least competitive on the EU market. Finally, we need to notice
that one division (30 – Manufacturing of office machines and computers) is
performing poorly on both the domestic and EU markets.
2.3. Domestic and External Competitiveness of 3-digit Industries
The highly competitive 3-digit industries hold domestic market shares within
the range of 70-90 percent. At the opposite extreme end there are uncompetitive (or
the least competitive) manufacturing groups whose domestic market shares do not
15
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Table 1. Domestic and External Competitiveness of Manufacturing Divisions (n=23)
Domestic CompetitivenessExternal
Competitiveness Highly Competitive Average Least Competitive
Highly Competitive 20 18 36
Average 26 37 19 21 25
27 28 31
33 34
17 29
18 32 35
Least Competitive 15 16
22 23
24 30
exceed 30 percent. Results of the panel data analysis12 exhibit regularities in the
sense that usually the situation of a 3-digit industry’s competitive position is
coherent with the market position of a division to which this industry belongs.
The most competitive 3-digit industries on the domestic market were:
1) 151, 153, 155-159 – seven out of nine groups belonging to food and
beverages division (15); 
2) 160 – tobacco industry (at the same time division 16);
3) 201-203 – three industries belonging to division 20 (Manufacture of wood
and wood, straw and wicker products)13;
4) 221, 222 – two groups of division 22 (Publishing, printing and
reproduction of recorded media14) 
5) 231 – Manufacture of coke oven products and 232 – Manufacture of
refined petroleum products, two dominating industries out of the three
which form division 23;
6) 264, 265, 266 – three industries out of eight belonging to division 26
(Manufacturing of the non-metallic mineral products);
7) 281, 283 – two out of six industries from division 28 (Manufacturing of
metal products);
8) 352 – Manufacture of railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, which
is one of the five industries15 classified to division 35 (Manufacturing of
other transport equipment);
9) 361 – Manufacture of furniture; one, yet substantial industry classified
together with five others to division 36.
Altogether 22 out of 77 manufacturing groups (for which data is available)
may be regarded as highly competitive on the domestic market. This constitutes
almost one third. 
The group of the least competitive manufacturing industries on the domestic
market is slightly less numerous and consists of 19 industries, i.e. 25% of the total
number of these for which data is available. These are: 
1) 172 and 175 – two out of seven industries in the textiles division (17);
2) 191 – tanning and dressing of leather industry, one of three groups that
belong to division 19 – Processing of leather and manufacture of leather
16
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12 See Table 5 in the Appendix, row 20.
13 For the remaining two industries (204, 205) data is unavailable.
14 For the third and last group (223) data is missing.
15 Data for one of them is unavailable.
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products; 
3) the majority of industries classified to division 24: Manufacturing of
chemicals and chemical products (241-244 and 246-247); 
4) 291 – Manufacturing of machinery and equipment for the production and
use of mechanical power and 294 – Manufacture of machine tools; 
5) 300 – Manufacture of office machinery and computers; 
6) 315 – Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps;
7) 322 and 323 – two out of three industries in division 32 (Manufacturing
of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus);
8) 331 – Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic
appliances;
9) two out of three groups of division 34: 341 – Manufacture of motor
vehicles, 342 – Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles;
Manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers); 
10) 363 – Manufacturing of musical instruments.
As far as performance of the Polish manufacturers on the EU-15 market is
concerned, the panel data regression shows that the majority of 3-digit
industries are below the average external competitive level16. Out of the total
number of 89 manufacturing groups examined, the following 19 are competitive
above average: 
1) 153 – Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables;
2) 174 – Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel;
3) all three industries (181, 182, 183) of division 18 (Manufacture of wearing
apparel and furriery); 
4) all five industries (201-205) forming division 20 (Manufacture of wood
and wood products);
5) 231 – Manufacture of coke oven products;
6) 261, 262, 264, 265 (Manufacture of ceramic tiles, cement, lime and
plaster, glass and glass products, cable wires, metal construction);
7) 351, 352, 355 (Building and repairing of ships and boats, rolling stock); 
8) 361 – Manufacture of furniture.
The majority of the above average competitive manufacturing groups produce
17
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labor intensive and not technologically advanced goods.
Finally, let us compare the findings for the two markets: domestic and EU-15
one. The best group, which is very competitive on the domestic market and more
than average competitive on the external market, consists of 10 industries, which
accounts for 10% of the total population of 3-digit industries. These are the
following manufacturing groups:
153 – Processing and preserving of fruits and vegetables;
201 – Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnation of wood;
202 – Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, lamina-board etc.;
203 – Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery;
231 – Manufacture of coke oven products;
264 – Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products;
265 – Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster;
351 – Building and repairing of ships and boats;
352 – Manufacture of railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock; and
361 – Manufacture of furniture.
18
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Government interventions into economy may take different forms. Below, we
briefly present government policies exercised in the Polish manufacturing sector in
the years 1996-2003, which directly influenced performance of enterprises (direct
instruments). In addition, despite the fact that it is an indirect instrument of influence
on performance and competitiveness, we take a close look at the role of the state as an
owner of manufacturing companies. As far as direct interventions are concerned, it is
important to observe that in our studies we were limited by the availability of data for
individual industries: aggregated into 2-digit industries and 3-digit industries17.
3.1. Government as an Owner 
The role of the government as an owner had decreased considerably over the
last eight years under observation, however, the pace of change was very uneven
across various industries. These observations are based on two available data sets
which are used as proxies for the scope of the government.  The sets are: (a) a share
of state owned manufacturing companies in the total employment in the
manufacturing sector, and (b) a share of state owned manufacturing companies in
the total sold production of the manufacturing sector. Two reservations need to be
made here. Data is available only for 2-digit industries and due to specific rules of
statistical classifications18 gives an underestimated picture of the scope of the state
ownership in the manufacturing industries.  
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17 The entire list of direct instruments in use with annotation for which data is available is presented in
Section 4. There we also discuss shortcomings of the collected data.
18 In public statistics a company is regarded as state-owned when the government owns more then 50% of
the company’s shares. This implies that enterprises with less than 50% of shares in the state disposal are
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3. Government Intervention into the
Manufacturing Sector in the Years
1996-2003: Instruments and Scope
In 1996, the first year of our analysis, state-owned companies employed 1,135
thousand people in total (see Figure 3 below) and this accounted for as much as
40.5% of the total employment in the manufacturing sector (Figure 4). In the
course of the next seven-year period employment in state-owned companies had
been decreasing every year (see Figure 3) and altogether it shrank dramatically: by
906.6 thousand people (that is by 80%). On the one hand, this was an effect of the
privatization processes: its formal end result being a statistical reclassification of
enterprises (from the state to the private sector). On the other hand, state
enterprises undertook restructuring processes, in the course of which excessive
labor force was shed. A vast part of the labor force was absorbed by the fast
growing greenfield private sector. By the end of the studied period the state part of
the manufacturing sector employed 228.3 thousand workers. In relative terms it
was still a substantial number: 10.3% of the total manufacturing employment.
Obviously, a pace of privatization was very different in individual divisions of
the manufacturing sector and this is true for the entire transition period (1990-
2004). In the first year of our analysis 4 divisions out of the total number of 23
2-digit industries lagged behind in privatization: more than 80% of their total work
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classified as private. One may argue that this is correct since the majority shareholder may impose their
decision on the board, however, the Polish experience shows that the minority state shareholder may
effectively push important decisions through. Furthermore, in June 2005, after a hot debate, a new Law
on Special Rights of the Minority State Shareholder was voted by the Parliament. It gives the state the so-
called golden veto right in the case of listed crucial decisions in a group of enterprises that are “of special
importance for the public good and public security”.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Industry 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004.
Figure 3. Total Employment in State Owned Manufacturing Companies, 1996-2003 (in million)
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force concentrated in state owned enterprises19. This figure needs to be confronted
with the average employment in state owned companies of 40.5% for the
manufacturing sector. On the other side of the scale there are three divisions20 in
which employment had already concentrated in private companies, and state
companies accounted only for less than 20% of the total labor force. Seven years
later the size of the state sector remained to be differentiated among individual
industries. One industry, in which the state employment still dominated was
Manufacturing of coke and refined petroleum products (50.1%). In all others (22
divisions) the private sector was dominant, yet, the size of the state employment
varied very much: from the extreme of 44.8% (Manufacturing of basic metals) to
close to 1% (in two divisions: (a) Manufacture of pulp and paper; and (b)
Manufacturing of furniture).
As far as the other measure of the size of the state ownership in the
manufacturing sector is concerned, in 1996 the state sector had 37.3% share in
manufacturing sales (see Figure 4), which was slightly below the figure for
employment. In the course of the following years sales of state owned
manufacturing companies had declined (in nominal terms and current prices) with
the exception of the year 2000. By the period's end the share of the state sector in
the total manufacturing sales had gone down dramatically to 10%.
Similarly to the case of employment, also in sales there were and still are big
differences between individual divisions. In 1996, the seventh year of transition for
the Polish economy, in four divisions (out of the total number of 23) the state
ownership was still very strong with the more than 80% share in total
manufacturing sales. They were the same divisions as in the case of employment
(see Footnote 19). In the following years production (and sales) shifted significantly
from the state sector to the private one in every single division, however, in two
industries state enterprises maintained to play a substantial role. These were: (a)
Manufacture of basic metals, where the state owned companies generating 50,9%
of the total division’s sales (in 2003), and (b) Manufacture of coke and refined
petroleum products with the 43,8% share. Next, there are three divisions in which
the share of state companies in total manufacturing sales ranged from 20 to 30%;
these are (a) Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, (2) Manufacture of
other transport equipment, and (3) Recycling. In the remaining 18 divisions the
21
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19 These were: (1) Manufacture of tobacco products; (2) Manufacturing of coke and refined petroleum
products; (3) Manufacturing of basic metals; (4) Manufacturing of other transport equipment.
20 These were: (1) Manufacture of wearing apparel and furriery; (2) Publishing, printing and reproduction of
recorded media; and (3) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products.
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share of the state sector was less than 10%. In 6 industries out of these 18 ones
privatization practically had come to an end and the state ownership was hardly
present (only the 1-2% share in sales). These industries are: (a) Manufacture of
wearing apparel and furriery; (b) Manufacture of pulp and paper; (c) Manufacture
of office machines and computers; (d) Manufacture of radio, television,
communication equipment; (e) Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers, and (f) Manufacture of furniture.
3.2. Fiscal Policy
Companies registered in Poland are obliged to pay a number of taxes and these
are: (1) corporate income tax CIT (in the case of companies), or personal income
tax PIT (in the case of individual running of business as a sole proprietor), (2)
VAT21, (3) customs taxes, (4) excise tax (for a limited number of products sold on
22
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21 A business entity has to register for VAT and pay it when its annual turnover on transactions subject to
VAT exceeds 10,000 euro.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Industry 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004; Statistical Yearbook of
Poland 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002; the authors' own calculations.
Figure 4. The Employment in State Owned Manufacturing Companies to Total Employment in
the Manufacturing Sector Ratio (0-1). The Sold Production of State Owned Manufacturing
Companies to Total Sales of the Manufacturing Sector Ratio (0-1)
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the market), (5) local taxes, (6) social security contributions for employees, and (7)
social security contribution for the entrepreneur (in the case of individual running
of business).
Publicly available statistics for the manufacturing sector and its 2-digit
divisions present very limited amount of data on fiscal obligations of the enterprise
sector vis-à-vis the budget, i.e. on the fiscal policy of the government as perceived
by enterprises. Among the limited information there is data on liabilities due to the
central government stemming from three tax entitlements: income taxes (CIT and
PIT from individual businessmen), customs and social security as of an end of a
year. Another group of data available reveals the amount of income tax due in a
year. However, the received picture does not represent the entire sector and all
individual divisions. The presented data is collected solely from enterprises
employing over 9 people. We miss data concerning liabilities owed from smaller
companies and natural persons’ businesses.
In 1996 the total amount of liabilities of the manufacturing sector accounted
for 7.7 billion zloty. The amount had been growing each year since then and had
reached the level of 15 billion zloty by the end of the period under observation (see
Figure 5 below, left axis). The ratio of total liabilities to sales had fluctuated in the
analyzed period in a narrow bracket of 2.9 – 4% (see Figure 5 and right axis). 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Industry 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004; the authors' own calculations.
Figure 5. Total Liabilities vis-a-vis Government (in billion zloty; left axis), and The Total
Liabilities vis-a-vis Government to Sales Revenues Ratio (0-1; right axis)
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For individual 2-digit industries the ratio of total liabilities to sales varied
considerably. In 1996 it ranged from 1.1% (for division 21 - Manufacture of pulp
and paper) to 14.6% (division 19 - Processing of leather and manufacture of leather
products). By the end of the period the range had decreased to 1:5. 
The next Figure 6 presents obligations stemming solely from income tax
entitlements. In 1996 the total amount of income tax accounted for 4.2 billion zloty.
In the next year it increased by 24%, however, in the course of the following four
years had been constantly decreasing to finally fall down below the 1996 level by
12%. In 2001 the downward trend came to a halt and the amount of income
payments increased. In the last year under observation it grew again, yet this time
the increase was substantial - by 35%. 
In 1996 the amount of the paid income tax to manufacturing sales ratio
accounted for close to 2% and had been decreasing each year until 2001, when it
reached 1% - the lowest level in the eight-year period. In 2002 the ratio exceeded
1% and in 2003 reached 1.2%. 
These changes have to be seen in the context of decreasing CIT rates. From the
beginning of the transition to the market economy in 1990 and until 1996 inclusive
the CIT rate had been at the level of 40% and was regarded as high compared to
the majority of European countries and some other transition economies. In the
years 1997-1999 the tax rate had been gradually decreasing by 2 percent points
every year. The 1999 CIT reform envisaged a schedule for a gradual decrease of the
CIT rate over a five-year period (2000-2004) by a massive 12 percent points (from
34% in 1999 to 22% in 2004). Accordingly, in 2000 the rate was cut to 30%. In the
next years the reform schedule was changed: a pace of the rate’s decrease was
slowed down and in the last year under observation CIT was paid at the 27% rate.
A recent (as of 01/01/2004) and substantial cut to 19% was without any doubt
incited by good practices in other emerging economies. A volume of CIT tax
revenues for this year, however, is not captured by our analysis.
Ratios for individual 2-digit industries varied and ranged from 0.6% (for
division 23 – Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products) to 4.2% (for
division 22 – Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media) in 1996 and
from 0.2% (in division 16 – Manufacture of tobacco products) to 2.1% (division 33
– Manufacturing of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and
clocks) in 2003.
The next fiscal instrument under analysis is the excise duty, which was imposed
on the following goods: (a) engine fuel and its components, (b) alcohol and
24
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beverages, (c) tobacco products, (d) cars, (d) perfumes and cosmetics, (e)
electricity. The excise duty is calculated either as a percentage of a value of goods
produced or on a volume basis (a fixed rate per unit).
Data at our disposal comprise only 3-digit industries and is available for 94
manufacturing groups out of the total number of 102. Since we do not possess data
for all the industries, we are not in a position to say precisely what the total burden
of excise for the entire manufacturing sector (including 2-digit industries) was.
Below, there are findings for 3-digit industries. In the entire period the excise tax had
not been paid at all by 16 industries, which constitutes 17% of the total population.
For the majority of the remaining manufacturing groups the size of excise payments
was meaningless. Obviously, excise duty payments were an important obligation to
the state for three industries which produce goods levied with this tax. These were:
159 – Manufacture of beverages (the paid excise tax to total sales ratio
accounted for 43% in 1996 and 40% in 1997; in the next years it decreased
and fluctuated at 33.8% – 36.8%);
160 – Manufacture of tobacco products (51-55.8% in the years 1996-2000;
increased to 63.8-64.9 % in the years 2001-2002 and increased further to
72.4% in 2003);
232 – Manufacture of refined petroleum products (25.3-28.6% in the first two
years of observation; an increase to 32.2-33.9% in the course of next six years).
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Industry 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004; the authors' own calculations.
Figure 6. Income Tax (in billion zloty; left axis) and the Income Tax to Sales Revenues Ratio (0-1;
right axis), 1996-2003
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A relative volume of excise payments from other two industries producing
taxed goods: 341 – Manufacture of motor vehicles, and 245 – Manufacture of soap,
detergents, cleaning, polishing goods and perfumes, was much lower and
accounted for 0.2-1.2% and 0.3-0.4% respectively.
3.3. Industrial Policy: Government Subsidies 
In view of the fact that there is a variety of instruments available and used in
practice, the industrial policy may take different forms, however, in the case of
Poland negotiating its EU accession, the instruments had to be gradually adjusted
to state aid regulations binding in the European Union. Below we discuss a
traditional and the simplest instrument. Subsidies are transparent and easy to be
traced in companies’ books.  Furthermore, they are reported to the public statistics,
which makes them easily accessible. 
The Polish manufacturing sector as a whole had not received a substantial amount
of direct subsidies in the eight-year period of 1996-2003. In 1996 a direct state support
to manufacturers accounted for 514.6 million zlotys, which constituted 0.2% of the
total sales of the sector (see Figure 7 below). In 1997 government subsidies increased
(in nominal terms) by 20% (to 623 million zloty) and this 1997 (nominal) level was
maintained in the subsequent two years. However, a relative weight of state support
decreased. In 2000 the total amount of subsidies to the sector was cut by 22% as
compared to the previous year. In the years 2001-2002 the amount was raised by 8-
10% to 510-520 million zloty. In the last year of the analyzed period it fell to a much
lower level of 419 million zloty (less than 0.1% of the total manufacturing sales). Yet,
the experience from the past two years shows that this figure may be underestimated
and can be increased in the next edition of statistical yearbooks. 
Generally, we are able to conclude that this instrument of a direct support to
the manufacturing sector was meaningless in the whole period and its scope had
been decreasing.
All 2-digit industries had been receiving subsidies, however, some of them not
every year22. The state support was unevenly distributed among industries
(recipients of the relatively biggest support could get subsidies eight times bigger
26
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22 The extreme case is the tobacco industry which had not received subsidies in the years 1996-2000, but
since 2001 had been a beneficiary of the state aid as all other manufacturing divisions.
than the average), nevertheless, even for these privileged industries the relative size
of public aid was minor and had not reached 1% of the total sales23 in any case.
Data for 3-digit industries (available for 90 out of the total number of 102 industries)
shows a bigger differentiation between various groupings of manufacturers. First of all,
it is worth mentioning that a strong majority of manufacturing groups received state
subsidies regularly (i.e. every year) and only 4 industries received a direct public support
rather seldom, in 3 or 4 years out of 8 years under observation24. For the majority of the
aid’s recipients the relative size of the support remained to be very inconsiderable. Only
for three 3-digit industries state subsidies substantially surpassed the average for the
whole manufacturing sector and constituted a lasting trend and not a one-time
intervention. For two manufacturing groups (192 - Manufacture of luggage, handbags
and the like, saddler; 353 - Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft) state subsidies had
ranged from 1 to 3% of sales within the eight-year period. A direct state aid had a vital
importance for one industry. In five years from 1996 to 2000 weapons and ammunition
producers (group 296) had received a huge financial support from the government
(14.5%, 22.6%, 16.2%, 11.9%, and 7.4% respectively). In the subsequent three years it had
decreased substantially and at the end of the analyzed period accounted for only 0.4%.
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23 The highest one was for Manufacturing of machinery and equipment in 1996 when it accounted for 0.84%.
24 These were: 154 - Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats; 183 - Dressing and dyeing of fur and
manufacture of articles of fur; 263 - Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags; and 363 - Manufacture of
musical instruments.
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Industry 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004; the authors' own calculations.
Figure 7. Figure 7. Government Subsidies to Manufacturing Enterprises (in million zloty,
current prices; left axis) and the Government Subsidies to Manufacturing Enterprises to
Revenues from Sold Production Ratio (0-1; right axis), 1996-2003
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In this section we present results of an econometric analysis undertaken to test
a hypothesis that government policies negatively impact performance of the
enterprise sector. In other words, the hypothesis implies that the smaller the
government’s intervention to the economy, the better the economic performance.
In this paper we focus on an important part of the Polish economy: the
manufacturing sector, and as a performance indicator we use its domestic and
external competitiveness (DCM and ECM, as defined in Section 2 above). 
The econometric analysis was carried out for: 
1) 2-digit industries (i.e. manufacturing divisions), and
2) 3-digit industries (i.e. manufacturing groups).
Data sets for these two groupings of enterprises come from different sources
and they both have shortcomings, although different ones. The data on 2-digit
industries comes from publicly available publications of the Central Statistical
Office of Poland (Statistical Yearbooks of Industry). The available information
covers whole divisions25 for the majority of calculated indicators, which is an
advantage over the other data set. A disadvantage is a limitation of types of
published data, and consequently, some government instruments, which would be
of interest here, are not listed in the yearbooks.
The data on 3-digit industries comes from the official statistics of the enterprise
sector (collected by means of the so-called F-01 forms that are filled in by
companies), aggregated by the Central Statistical Office. An advantage of this source
is affluence of types of data collected. Nevertheless, there are two disadvantages and
28
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25 with the exception of data on two out of ten independent variables for 2-digit industries examined in this paper;
these two regard economic entities employing over 9 persons. For more details see Section 4.1.1 below.
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4. Impact of Government Policies
on Competitiveness of the Polish
Manufacturing Sector – Empirical
Evidence
both are serious. One is that the data is collected only for economic entities
employing over 9 persons. This means that a part of the manufacturing sector
remains beyond our analysis. Consequently, our findings are biased towards bigger
enterprises26. The other one is that the Central Statistical Office does not on purpose
disclose data for quite a big number of 3-digit industries. Additionally, the data base
was difficult to obtain since it is not publicly accessible; it was disclosed at a special
individual request and the access was charged.
Results of econometric estimations made in order to test the hypothesis about
a negative influence of the government policies on the competitiveness of the Polish
manufacturing sector on the domestic and EU-15 market are presented in two
subsections below27. 
4.1. Estimation for 2-digit Industries 
4.1.1. Variables and Types of Analysis
As our main interest focuses on the impact of government policies on the
performance of Polish manufacturing divisions on both domestic and external
markets, we take into consideration two variables as dependent ones:
1. a share of Polish sold manufacturing production in the domestic
consumption of manufacturing products (DCM) ; and 
2. a share of Polish exports to the EU-15 in intra-exports of the EU-25 (EMC)*.
Data necessary to calculate DCM was obtained from KWIU statistical
databases, while data for ECM - from COMEXT database. Values of ECM for
divisions are aggregated from data available for 3-digit industries. 
Let us underpin that all 23 divisions were included into the analysis. 
We used the following 10 factors as independent variables:
1. a share of employment in state owned manufacturing companies in the
total employment in the manufacturing sector; 
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26 A question arises, however, in which direction this bias disturbs our results, i.e. whether the sector of
bigger enterprises is on average more or less competitive than the entire manufacturing sector.
27 Grzegorz Szymański made the estimations; subsequent procedures, steps and results of regressions are
presented in his technical report (Szymański 2005).
* See definitions in Section 2.
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2. a share of sales of state owned manufacturing companies in the total sales
of the manufacturing sector;  
3. the subsidies to sales ratio;
4. the total labor cost to sales revenues ratio;
5. the gross fixed assets (deflated with the investment goods prices index) to
sales (deflated with producer price index - PPI) ratio; 
6. the income tax to sales ratio28
7. the total liabilities vis-à-vis government (CIT and PIT income taxes,
customs and social security contributions) to sales ratio29;
8. the investment to sales ratio;
9. the concentration coefficient for 2-digit manufacturing sections30; 
10. the producer price index, 2-digit industries.
Five out of ten independent variables (numbered 1, 2, 3, 6, 7) are regarded here
as indicators of the size of the Polish government’s intervention into economy to
which Polish manufacturers are directly or indirectly exposed. As it was mentioned
above, while choosing these 5 indicators, we were constrained by accessibility of
data for 2-digit industries. 
Three types of analysis were made for each of the two dependent variables31.
First, we analyzed the overall competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector
by making regressions on averages for the entire period under observation. Thanks
to this step, we could receive a general model and separate key economic factors
explaining change in DCM and ECM. Second, competitiveness in subsequent years
was analyzed separately. As a result, a set of models was obtained, allowing us to
examine what factors influenced both DCM and ECM in different years. This
enabled us to observe trends. Third, we carried out panel data regressions with
fixed effects in order to look for differences among manufacturing divisions.
Individual effects appeared to be significant32.
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28 Note: data on income tax available only for economic entities employing over 9 persons; this is why in
order to calculate the ratio for this group of companies, we also take the data for sales revenues (and not
the total sales for the manufacturing sector as the case with the dependent variable of DCM is).
29 The same reservation applies as for variable 6.
30 This is a so-called market concentration coefficient (MCC). Concentration is understood here as
irregularities in a distribution of a given phenomenon according to a class dimension (i.e. deviation of an
actual distribution from a regular distribution). In addition to a general weakness of this particular index,
values of the coefficient calculated for the Polish manufacturing sector and for 2-digit industries have to
be interpreted with reservations. The index is calculated for economic entities employing more than 50
persons until 1998, and over 49 since 1999.
31 Methodology is discussed in detail in Sobolewski (2005a). 
32 Results of the panel data regressions are presented in sub-section 2.2 above.
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Final specifications of all models were obtained by applying general to specific
methodology. With some exceptions, the specifications are robust to problems
arising from autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and multicolinearity. 
Additionally, regressions were made on the restricted sets of variables which
had appeared to be significant in the previous analysis made for the years 1996-
2001 (see: Sobolewski 2004a). These models, applied to an enlarged data set, have
lower explanatory power (lower goodness-of-fit) than new models elaborated in the
present study, which are estimated on an unrestricted data set.
In the process of estimation, a proper functional form of models used in the
analysis of both types of competitiveness turned out to be linear33.
4.1.2. Results of Estimations for Domestic Competitiveness of the Polish
Manufacturing Sector
Results of regressions from various models made for 2-digit manufacturing
industries (see: Table 3 in the Appendix, rows 1-4) show that the overall domestic
competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector in the whole studied period was
positively influenced by:
1) a share of total labor costs in the revenues from sales,
2) the producer price index (PPI),
3) a size of investment, and
4) a share of sales of state owned manufacturing companies in the total
manufacturing sales. 
A relevant fact for the aim of this paper is that the model revealed a negative
influence of the state policies on the performance of the manufacturing sector also
on the domestic market. Three out of five factors proved to have a significant and
negative impact on DCM. These were:
5) the subsidies to sales ratio, 
6) the employment in state owned manufacturing companies to total
manufacturing employment ratio,
7) the total liabilities vis-à-vis government to sales ratio.  
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33 This conclusion differs from an outcome of the previous estimation, performed for the six-year period from
1996 to 2001. In the mentioned estimation a proper functional form of models used in an analysis of
domestic competitiveness proved to be log-linear, whereas external competitiveness was best described by
linear functional form models. The functional form is important for interpretation of relationship between
coefficients’ values and dependent variables. In the case of log-linear models these values indicate elasticity
and in the case of linear models they indicate changes in absolute levels of dependent variables.
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The bigger a relative size of subsidies and total liabilities vis-à-vis government,
the smaller domestic competitiveness of the manufacturing sector turned out to be.
The same was found to be true for the state ownership in the manufacturing
sector34. These three findings support our hypothesis about an unfavorable impact
of the government’s fiscal policies and involvement in corporate governance on the
performance of the enterprise sector. 
In the case of subsidies there is a finding that questions an aim of the state
aid35. Subsidies are commonly perceived as a proper government’s instrument to
even the playground for economic entities. Instead, as this study may indicate
that they reduce pressure on firms to engage in restructuring and petrify
economic inefficiency; as a result, competitiveness of industries on the domestic
market worsens.
The inefficacy of this form of state aid may be also explained by the fact that it
was wrongly addressed, since it was motivated by political rather than economic
considerations and under pressure of well-organized employees protecting their
workplace36.
A negative impact of a size of employment in the state manufacturing sector on
the competitiveness of industries did not surprise us. An influence of the state
ownership on the performance of individual enterprises, industries, and entire
economies has been tested in numerous empirical studies worldwide. In the case
of Polish manufacturing enterprises in the years 1996-2003 the negative impact of
the state ownership may by explained primarily by poor management exposed and
prone to pressures exercised successfully by strong trade unions and influential
politicians. As a result, state-owned enterprises could continue to have excessive
employment and similarly higher wages than their private counterparts37. 
A negative impact of fiscal duties to central and local governments on the
competitiveness of companies is not surprising, too. Obligatory payments to the
central or local budgets either increase costs of manufacturing production or
decrease an amount of profits that remains at enterprises’ disposal and may be
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34 This conclusion is yet weakened by the opposite result for the impact of sales of the state sector on DCM
(in model no 2, see row 2 in Table 3 in the Appendix).
35 An important reservation has to be made here. This relationship needs to be checked and a time lag should
be introduced to the analysis, which would, however, require more observations than we had. Therefore,
we may come back to this issue sometime in future, when a number of observations increases.
36 This hypothesis is supported by findings of Kopczewski, Rogowski and Socha (2003). Having analyzed data
of a panel of 10,000 Polish enterprises they found that the state aid was more pronounced in large, state
owned firms in more concentrated industries.
37 This has been proved in another project completed recently at CASE, see Antczak (2004).
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spent on investments. The importance of a size of investment for domestic
competitiveness of manufacturing divisions was proved by our study. 
Regressions made for each year of the analyzed period indicate a growing negative
importance of concentration on domestic competitiveness of the manufacturing sector
(from -1.1 in 1996 up to -1.7 in 2003)38. Interestingly enough, this variable is not
significant in the model for overall competitiveness. In the majority of studied years a
size of total liabilities vis-à-vis government had an increasing negative impact on
domestic competitiveness (-2.7 in 1998, -6.2 in 2003). Similar regressions but made
with under log-linear specification brought about the same findings with regard to
these two variables39. Moreover, they indicated a growing positive impact of
investment size (increasing coefficients) for the years 1999-2001, and a positive and
stable relation between domestic competitiveness and a relative size of labor costs in
the years 1996-1997 and 2002-2003. Additionally, in the first two years under
observation we noticed a negative impact of the income tax on domestic
competitiveness. Other factors seem to have a stable impact on domestic
competitiveness over a sequence of years, although according to our modeling, not all
of them are significant in each year. 
4.1.3. Results of Estimations for External Competitiveness of the Polish
Manufacturing Sector
Results of the linear modeling (see: Table 4 in the Appendix, rows 1 and 2)40
show that six factors turned out to be important for the performance of external
competitiveness (or strictly speaking the EU-15 one) of the Polish manufacturing
sector. One of them: 
(1) the total labor costs to sales revenues ratio
positively influenced ECM in the whole period under observation. It is worth
noticing that this factor was found significant and positive also in the case of
domestic competitiveness.
The following remaining five factors (four of them indicating the government’s
intervention into the business environment) had a major negative impact: 
(2) income tax payments, 
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(3) total liabilities vis-à-vis government,
(4) concentration,
(5) subsidies, and
(6) a size of the state owned sector (measured by its share in the total
manufacturing employment).
These findings seem to support our hypothesis that fiscal duties and the state
ownership do not facilitate an increase of ECM. It provides us with yet another piece
of evidence that a direct state support to enterprises in a form of subsidies does not
contribute to improvement of the position of Polish manufacturers on the EU-15
market, but, on the contrary, weakens their performance on foreign markets.
The next step in studying an impact of group of factors on ECM of the
manufacturing sector were regressions made for each year of the analyzed period.
They produced several results41. Income tax payments had a bigger (and negative)
impact on performance of exporters to the EU-15 market in the course of time (an
increase from -0.75 in 1996 to -1.8 in 2001). Variables such as: state ownership
(measured by the state employment ratio), liabilities vis-à-vis government and the
concentration coefficient (all three having a negative impact) and relative labor
costs (a positive impact) appeared to be significant in the model of overall
competitiveness, yet, only in some years. Interestingly enough, there are not any
variables significant in models for years 2002 and 2003.
4.2. Estimation for 3-digit Industries 
4.2.1. Variables and Types of Analysis
In order to make estimations for 3-digit industries we took the same two
variables (as for 2-digit industries) treated as dependent ones:
1. a share of Polish manufacturing industries’ sold production in the
domestic consumption of manufacturing products - DCM;
2. a share of Polish manufacturing industries’ exports to the EU-15 in EU-
25 intra-exports (EMC).
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Due to a lack of data for a number of manufacturing groups, the analysis could
not embrace the entire population: for DCM regressions were made only for 77 out
of the total number of 102 industries, while for ECM – 89 industries were taken into
account. 
We applied the following 13 factors as independent variables:
1. the subsidies to sales ratio; 
2. the relative unit labor cost: Poland to the EU-15 (i.e. a ratio of labor costs
to sales revenues in Poland to labor cost to sales revenues in the EU-15);
3. unit energy costs (the energy costs to sales ratio); 
4. the income tax to sales ratio;
5. the depreciation to sales ratio; 
6. the depreciation to investment layouts ratio;
7. the investment layouts to sales ratio;
8. investment per employee (the investment layouts to employment ratio);
9. the excise tax to sales ratio;
10. the ratio of revenues from VAT free sales to total sales revenues from
production subject to VAT  taxation;
11. the ratio of revenues from sales subject to a special VAT rate to total
sales revenues from production subject to VAT taxation;
12. the ratio of revenues from sales subject to a regular VAT rate (22%) to
total sales revenues from production subject to VAT taxation;
13. the ratio of revenues from VAT free sales and special VAT rate sales to
revenues from sales subject to a regular VAT rate (22%).
Nine out of thirteen independent variables (1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) measure
a size of the government’s intervention into the activity and performance of
manufacturing companies and their groupings. In the analysis we focus on their
impact on competitiveness of the manufacturing sector. 
In the case of domestic competitiveness, a subset consisted of 12 variables (1-
12). In the case of external competitiveness, a subset contained variables 1-9 and 13.
We applied the same methodology as in the case of 2-digit industries42. In the
process of estimation a proper functional form of models used in the analysis of
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external competitiveness proved to be log-linear, whereas for domestic
competitiveness - linear43.
4.2.2. Results of Estimations for Domestic Competitiveness of the Polish
Manufacturing Sector
Results of regressions from various models made for 3-digit manufacturing
industries show (see Table 5 in the Appendix, row 1) that the overall domestic
competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector in the whole period under
consideration was positively influenced by:
1) depreciation relative to sales revenues, 
2) excise tax payments relative to total sales revenues, and 
3) a size of sales subject to preferential VAT taxation.
Two factors listed below had a significant negative impact on domestic
competitiveness in the whole period under the analysis:
4) unit energy costs, and
5) the relative size of income tax. 
Let us put emphasis on the fact that outcomes of regressions done for 3-digit
manufacturing industries indicate different factors as positive and significantly
important for overall competitiveness of the manufacturing sector on the domestic
market, than outcomes produced by regressions performed on data for 2-digit
industries do (see Section 4.1.2 above). In the case of all three factors listed above
the explanation for such an outcome is obvious: we did not apply any of them as a
variable in regressions based on the data set for 2-digit industries due to a lack of
these types of data. On the other hand, two (out of a group of three) variables which
had been discovered to be significant and positive in the previous analysis (a share
of total labor costs in the revenues from sales and the producer price index) were
not included in regressions made with the data set for 3-digit industries. The third
variable found significant in regressions on the 2-digit industries data, i.e. a relative
size of investment, did not prove to be important for DCM in regressions on the 3-
digit industries data. However, a relative depreciation appeared, which is a
significant source for financing investment layouts in enterprises.
The finding that preferential VAT rates affect DCM positively is consistent and
may be explained by an increased demand for goods sold at lower prices due to a
lower VAT imposed on them. 
A positive influence of the excise tax (which is an ad valorem tax) on domestic
36
Ewa Balcerowicz, Maciej Sobolewski
CASE Reports No. 62
competitiveness could be explained with the following argument. The excise tax
imposed on a limited number of goods (see them listed in Section 3.2) hinders
imports of more expensive foreign products levied with the tax (cigarettes, alcohol,
cars), thus making more room for cheaper domestic producers. This explanation
needs further verification, though. At the same time the excise tax appears to have
a negative effect on foreign competitiveness (see Section 4.2.3 below), which
results from its impact on a consumer price, curbing a consumers’ demand. 
Corporate income tax payments proved to have a strong and negative effect not
only on a position of Polish manufacturers on the domestic market vis-à-vis importers,
but as we demonstrate in the next subsection, also on their market share in the EU-
25. The reason is that due CIT payments are deducted from profits, and in that way
they decrease enterprises’ internal sources of financing investment and growth.
The regressions indicate that unit energy costs hinder domestic competitiveness.
We may attempt to explain this phenomenon with prices of energy in Poland higher
than in other countries, which would give a comparative advantage to foreign
manufactures and place them in a better position vis-à-vis Polish producers on the
Polish market. This hypothesis needs to be verified, especially taking into account
results of the regressions on external competitiveness that seem to question such an
explanation (see next subsection). These outcomes show that unit energy costs in
Poland are found to affect positively competitiveness of Polish manufacturers on the
EU-15 market. A correct explanation here may be cheaper imports to Poland from
other than the EU-15 countries.
Regressions made for each year of the analyzed period separately44 revealed a
stable positive impact of the excise tax and an increasing positive impact of a size
of sales subject to preferential VAT taxation on domestic competitiveness. A stable
and negative impact of the corporate income tax on domestic competitiveness can
be observed until 2000. The reasoning why this relation ended in 2000 was
presented in sub-section 3.2 above, where we briefly discuss the 1999 CIT reform
which lowered fiscal pressure. 
4.2.3. Results of Estimations for External Competitiveness of the Polish
Manufacturing Sector
Results of regressions made for the entire eight-year period (see Table 6 in the
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Appendix, row 1) indicate that external competitiveness of the Polish
manufacturing sector was positively influenced only by:
1) the unit energy cost,
and negatively affected by the following five factors:
2) the income tax relative to sales revenues ratio,
3) the depreciation to investment layouts ratio, 
4) the investment layouts to employment ratio,
5) the excise tax to sales revenues ratio,  and
6) the size of sales subject to preferential VAT taxation ratio.
Comments on two variables: unit energy cost and excise duties were inserted
in the previous subsection. A significance of income tax payments for ECM
resembles the same result from other regressions in this study. A negative impact
of the investment layouts to employment and depreciation to investment layouts
ratios is difficult to explain. A negative effect of investment on external
competitiveness might be caused by the past structure of Polish exports that could
concentrate more on labor-intensive products. 
Results of regressions performed for each year separately45 show that a negative
influence of investment layouts to employment decreases every year. Moreover, a
negative impact of both deprecation to investment layouts and the income tax on
external competitiveness was rather stable and significant in almost every year.
Regressions based on a general-to-specific methodology suggest that, apart
from the three above mentioned factors, relative unit labor cost (growing in
importance) and unit energy cost are also persistent regressors.
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This study proved that the government policies are important for the
performance of the enterprise sector. 
Firstly, the analysis brought about yet another empirical evidence of a
significant and negative impact of the state ownership on performance of the
enterprise sector. Results of regressions carried out for the Polish manufacturing
sector indicate that maintaining enterprises in the state’s hands negatively
influenced competitiveness of the industry on both the domestic and EU-15 markets
in the years 1996-2003. Such a finding provides us with an obvious
recommendation for the government to necessarily withdraw from the ownership of
enterprises.   
Secondly, the research proved the importance of the fiscal policy for a position
of the enterprise sector. The tax burden imposed on manufacturers turned out to
be negative for a competitive position of Polish enterprises both on the domestic
and European Union member countries’ markets. Therefore, it is justified to
conclude that governments have to bear it in mind while preparing state budgets
and looking for additional tax revenues to finance public spending. Since the state
aid belongs to one of budgetary spending items, let us move to the third and last
conclusion. 
Results of the study question a rationale of public direct financial support to
enterprises. The direct support was found to be counterproductive: instead of
helping enterprises, subsidies negatively affected a competitive position of Polish
manufacturers vis-à-vis foreign competitors on the domestic as well as external
markets in the years 1996-2003. 
Summing up, competitiveness of the Polish manufacturing sector could be
increased by promoting competition in divisions through relaxing fiscal burden,
further privatization and restructuring of state owned companies. State aid in a
form of subsidies seems to harm both internal and external competitiveness rather
than to support them.
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Appendix
Table 1. List of Divisions of the Manufacturing Sector (2-digit industries by the NACE rev. 1.1
classification)
Classification
number Name of Division
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
16 Manufacture of tobacco products
17 Manufacture of textiles
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel and furriery
19 Processing of leather and manufacture of leather products
20 Manufacture of wood and wood, straw and wicker products
21 Manufacture of pulp and paper
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
23 Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products
24 Manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products
25 Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
26 Manufacturing of the non-metalic mineral products
27 Manufacturing of basic metals
28 Manufacturing of metal products
29 Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
30 Manufacturing of office machines and computers
31 Manufacturing of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
32
Manufacturing of radio, television and communication
equipment and apparatus
33
Manufacturing of medical, precision and optical instruments,
watches and clocks
34 Manufacturing of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
35 Manufacturing of other transport equipment
36 Manufacturing of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
37 Recycling
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Table 2. List of Groups of the Manufacturing Sector (3-digit industries by the NACE rev. 1.1
classification)
Classification
number Name of Group
151 Production, processing, preserving of meat, meat products
152 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
153 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables
154 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats
155 Manufacture of dairy products
156
Manufacture of grain mill products,
starches and starch products
157 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds
158 Manufacture of other food products
159 Manufacture of beverages
160 Manufacture of tobacco products
171 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres
172 Textile weaving
173 Finishing of textiles
174 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel
175 Manufacture of other textiles
176 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics
177 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles
181 Manufacture of leather clothes
182 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur
191 Tanning and dressing of leather
192 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddler
193 Manufacture of footwear
201 Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnation of wood
202
Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood,
laminboard, particle board, fibre board
and other panels and boards
203 Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery
204 Manufacture of wooden containers
205
Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture
of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials
211 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
212 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard
221 Publishing
222 Printing and service activities related to printing
223 Reproduction of recorded media
231 Manufacture of coke oven products
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products
233 Processing of nuclear fuel
241 Manufacture of basic chemicals
242 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products
243
Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings,
printing ink and mastics
244
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals
and botanical products
245 Manufacture of soap, detergents, cleaning, polishing
246 Manufacture of other chemical products
247 Manufacture of man-made fibres
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251 Manufacture of rubber products
252 Manufacture of plastic products
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products
262
Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than
for construction purposes; manufacture of refractory
ceramic products
263 Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags
264 Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products
265 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster
266 Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster, cement
267 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
268 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
271 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (ECSC)
272 Manufacture of tubes
273
Other first processing of iron and steel 
and production of non-ECSC ferro-alloys
274 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals
275 Casting of metals
281 Manufacture of structural metal products
282
Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal;
 manufacture of central  heating radiators and boilers
283
Manufacture of steam generators,
except central heating hot water boilers
284
Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal;
powder metallurgy
285
Treatment and coating of metals;
general mechanical engineering
286 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware
287 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products
291
Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of
mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines
292 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery
293 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery
294 Manufacture of machine-tools
295 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery
296 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
297 Manufacture of domestic appliances, n.e.c.
300 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
311 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
312 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus
313 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable
314
Manufacture of accumulators,
primary cells and primary batteries
315 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps
316 Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c.
321
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes 
and other electronic components
322
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters 
and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
323
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video
recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
331
Manufacture of medical and surgical
equipment and orthopaedic appliances
Table 2. Continued
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332
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring,
checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except
industrial process control equipment
333 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment
334 Manufacture of optical instruments, photographic equipment
335 Manufacture of watches and clocks
341 Manufacture of motor vehicles
342
Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles;
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers
343 Manufacture of parts, accessories for motor vehicles
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats
352 Manufacture of railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock
353 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
354 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles
355 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.
361 Manufacture of furniture
362 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles
363 Manufacture of musical instruments
364 Manufacture of sports goods
365 Manufacture of games and toys
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.
Table 2. Continued
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Table 3. Regression Coefficients for the Dependent Variable: Domestic Competitiveness
of the Polish Manufacturing Sector (DCM). Data for 2-digit industries
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Row 1: Overall competitiveness in the entire period of 1996-2003. The basic model has a linear form and was
obtained by means of from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
Rows 2 and 3: Estimations on the restricted sets of variables developed in two linear models from the
previous analysis for the period 1996-2001. 
Row 4: The log-linear estimation on the restricted set of variables developed in the best-fitted model from the
previous analysis for the period 1996-2001. 
Next rows contain models estimated for subsequent years with the restricted set of variables and according
to from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS).
In row 37 there is a panel data model with fixed effects (FE) underneath.
Table 3. Continued
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Row 1: Overall competitiveness in the entire period 1996-2003. The basic model has a linear form and was
obtained by means of from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
Row 2. An alternative model with the analogous specification as in the previous analysis for the period 1996-
2001 (updated). 
Next rows contain models estimated for subsequent years with the restricted set of variables and according
to from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
In row 19 there is a panel data model with fixed effects (FE) underneath.
Table 4. Regression Coefficients for the Dependent Variable: External Competitiveness of the
Polish Manufacturing Sector. Data for 2-digit industries
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Row 1: Overall competitiveness in the entire period 1996-2003. The basic model has a linear form and was
obtained by means of from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
Row 2: Estimation on the restricted sets of variables developed in two linear models from the previous
analysis for the period 1996-2001. 
Next rows contain models estimated for subsequent years with the restricted set of variables and according
to from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
In row 20 there is a panel data model with fixed effects (FE) underneath.
Table 5. Regression Coefficients for the Dependent Variable: Domestic Competitiveness
of the Polish Manufacturing Sector (DCM). Data for 3-digit industries
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Row 1: Overall competitiveness in the whole period 1996-2003. The basic model has a log-linear form and
was obtained by means of from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
Row 2. An alternative model with the analogous specification as in the previous analysis for the period 1996-
2001 (updated). 
Next rows contain models estimated for subsequent years with the restricted set of variables and according
to from-general-to-specific methodology (FGTS). 
In row 19 there is a panel data model with fixed effects (FE) underneath.
Table 6. Regression Coefficients for the Dependent Variable: External Competitiveness of the
Polish Manufacturing Sector (ECM). Data for 3-digit industries
